


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17 April 1955



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
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 10
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☒
[] DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 8/1/80 REVIEWER: 



Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



State Dept. review completed

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SUMMARY

GENERAL

2. Britain and France stiffen resistance to Soviet terms on disarmament (page 3).

WESTERN EUROPE

5. Reactions to the Austrian-Soviet talks (page 6).

THE FORMOSA STRAITS (page 7)

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GENERAL



2. Britain and France stiffen resistance to Soviet terms on disarmament:



Britain and France now intend to insist on a major Soviet concession before they formally submit their amendment to the four-power disarmament resolution of 8 March in the

current UN disarmament subcommittee talks in London. The French-British amendment provides for the "carrying out of a complete prohibition and elimination" of nuclear weapons simultaneously with the start of the final stage of agreed-on reductions in conventional armaments.

As examples of the required Soviet concession, British delegate Anthony Nutting cited to American delegate Wadsworth acceptance by Moscow of military force levels between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 men, or agreement to establish effective international controls from the outset, or both.

Comment: The USSR has insisted on a percentage reduction in force levels and the right of veto.

The American delegation reported on 6 April that British and French pressure on the United States to accept Moch's proposal in modified form was mounting.

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WESTERN EUROPE

5. Reactions to the Austrian-Soviet talks:

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The British Foreign Office regards Soviet concessions on Austria as the beginning of a new "gambit" on Germany, according to American officials in London. The British feel that the Western powers have no option but to take a position "which can not be interpreted as an intention to delay quickest possible progress toward the conclusion of an Austrian treaty."

Austrian Chancellor Raab stated on 17 April that his government would invite the big four powers to a conference on the Austrian state treaty "as soon as possible." Raab may issue the invitation in a speech to the Austrian parliament on 27 April, the tenth anniversary of the formation of the Austrian government. French Foreign Ministry officials, concerned that the invitation might come for a conference of foreign ministers, have suggested that the Western powers might take the initiative immediately for a conference in Vienna on the ambassadorial level in order to restrict the discussion to Austria.

Ambassador Bohlen thinks the USSR, anticipating that difficulties may arise over the text of a four-power guarantee of Austrian independence and territorial integrity, may be prepared to issue a unilateral guarantee. He warns that such a guarantee would be most damaging for the future position of Austria, offer Moscow a pretext for future intervention, and at least imply a semiprotectorate status for Austria.

THE FORMOSA STRAITS

Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group for the Formosa Straits Problem

This report is based on information received in Washington
up to 1800 hours 17 April 1955.

1. **No significant developments have been reported.**

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CHINA-FORMOSA SITUATION

